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Abstract in English 
If the EU stands alone in adopting climate policy and imposes a strict emissions ceiling, 
competitiveness of EU energy-intensive sectors will be affected negatively. Relocation of EU 
energy-intensive firms to countries with a lax regime also leads to carbon leakage. However, 
when use is made of the opportunities of the Clean Development Mechanism these impacts are 
very modest. Border tax adjustments (BTAs) to ‘level the playing field’ between domestic and 
foreign producers may be considered to address the concerns about both competitiveness and 
carbon leakage. It is far from clear whether these measures are WTO-proof. Simulations show 
that both an import levy and an export refund restore competitiveness to a certain extent. BTAs 
may lower the costs for energy-intensive sectors, but induce higher costs for other sectors. This 
paper uses a general equilibrium model to quantify and assess the implications of a number of 
policy scenarios.  
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Abstract in Dutch 
Als de EU alleen staat in het voeren van klimaatbeleid en een streng emissieplafond oplegt, 
wordt het concurrentievermogen van energie-intensieve sectoren aangetast. Ook leidt 
verplaatsing van energie-intensieve bedrijven naar landen met een lakser klimaatbeleid tot 
weglekken van de emissiereductie-inspanning. Als gebruik wordt gemaakt van de 
mogelijkheden van het Clean Development Mechanism, zijn deze effecten echter zeer 
bescheiden. Corrigerende grensmaatregelen (border tax adjustments, BTA’s) kunnen worden 
overwogen om een gelijk speelveld  te handhaven tussen binnenlandse en buitenlandse 
producenten en de koolstoflekkage te verminderen. Het is echter nog verre van duidelijk of dit 
soort maatregelen in WTO kader acceptabel zijn. Simulaties laten zien dat zowel een 
importheffing als een exportrestitutie het concurrentievermogen in zekere mate kunnen 
herstellen. BTA’s beperken de kosten in energie-intensieve sectoren, maar leiden wel tot hogere 
kosten voor andere sectoren. Deze studie gebruikt een toegepast-algemeen-evenwichtsmodel 
om de gevolgen van een aantal beleidsscenario’s te kwantificeren en te analyseren. 
Steekwoorden: klimaatbeleid; grensheffing; opbrengsten terugsluizen; Clean Development 
Mechanism 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   5 
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Preface 
With the launching in January 2008 of its climate change action plan ’20 20 in 2020’ the 
European Commission has made a firm opening bid in the ongoing negotiations about the post-
2012 architecture of world-wide measures against global warming. Though these may yield the 
‘grand coalition’ that is needed to mobilise the emission reduction efforts that would offer a 
chance of meeting the EU temperature objective (limiting the rise of the mean global 
temperature to 2 degrees Celsius), it is also possible that the coalition will remain (much) more 
limited. In that case energy-intensive industries in the EU are at a competitive loss against the 
countries that are not conducting climate policy. Moreover carbon leakage is likely to occur, 
partly offsetting the reduction efforts made by the coalition. These concerns have led to the so-
called border tax debate: would it be sensible to impose the domestic carbon tax on imports 
from countries that are not part of the coalition, while exempting exports to such countries from 
this tax?  
 
This document that is a co-production of PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
and CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis addresses the border tax issue. The 
authors investigate the legitimacy of these measures within the WTO-framework. Making use 
of the global general equilibrium model WorldScan, they assess  the impacts of adopting carbon 
import levies and export refunds for ETS-sectors in the EU when the EU would be virtually 
stand-alone in adopting strict emissions ceilings.  
 
The conclusions of the study are that carbon border measures do indeed help to restore a level 
playing field for energy-intensive sectors in the EU and do reduce carbon leakage. Yet, 
adopting border measures may entail welfare losses, may be difficult to implement and 
compatibility with WTO-rules is far from guaranteed. Alternative measures, in particular 
recycling part of permit auction revenues to exposed ETS-sectors and greater reliance on the 
Clean Development Mechanism, should be considered as serious contenders.  
 
The authors benefited from the discussions with the members of an ad hoc feedback group. In 
particular they are grateful for the comments and reflections of Esther Berden, Maurits Blanson 
Henkemans , Sander Kes (Ministry of Economic Affairs), Ewout Visser (Ministry of Finance), 
Marijn Holwerda (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Frans Duijnhouwer (Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment). Comments of colleagues Johannes Bollen, Herman 
Vollebergh (PBL) and Rob Aalbers,  Stefan Boeters, Albert van der Horst en Bas ter Weel 
(CPB) also helped to improve this study. 
 
Maarten Hajer            Coen Teulings  
Director PBL                       Director CPB   8 
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Summary 
The stringent climate policy proposed by the European Commission raises concerns about 
competitiveness and effectiveness. European firms, faced with a price of carbon, would be at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to regions with a more lax climate policy. Particularly in 
energy-intensive sectors, this might lead to a loss of production and of jobs. Also, a shift in 
activity towards non-abating countries would induce higher emissions outside the EU. This 
carbon leakage would undermine the effectiveness of the policy to reduce overall emissions. 
 
There may be an argument to impose carbon border taxes to restore competitive fairness and 
prevent carbon leakage. This paper focuses on import levies on energy-intensive imports and 
refunds on exports of European energy-intensive sectors. A number of stylized policy scenarios 
are considered to analyse the impact on competitiveness and to assess the potential for border 
tax measures. The focus is on sectors covered by the European  Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS). ETS-sectors are energy-intensive and can be expected to be most vulnerable to foreign 
competition. Our quantitative results are derived from simulations with CPB’s global general 
equilibrium model WorldScan. 
 
A stand alone European climate policy will lead to adjustments in energy-intensive sectors. If 
the opportunities of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to reduce emissions  in 
developing countries would not be used, production in these sectors arrives in 2020 on average 
4.5% below the no-policy case and employment 3.2%. Foreign competitors increase their 
energy-intensive production and this increase amounts to 40% of the production loss of EU-
firms. Carbon leakage is somewhat over 3%. This means that 3% of the intended emissions 
reduction is made undone by extra emissions elsewhere. By contrast, in a global climate policy 
setting, European energy-intensive  firms could increase their market share. Their relatively 
better energy-efficiency would then lead to a competitive advantage.  
 
We show the impacts of border tax measures against the background of a scenario where 
Europe is virtually alone in imposing stringent emissions ceilings and refrains from using CDM 
as a means to alleviate its burden. Border tax measures would restore competitiveness to a 
certain extent. The combination of import levies and export refunds may halve the loss in 
production and employment. Because Europe is a net exporter of energy-intensive products, a 
refund on exports is more effective to support employment in ETS-sectors than a levy on 
imports. However, refunds are welfare decreasing for Europe. Due to favourable terms-of-trade 
effects, EU welfare effects of import levies are slightly positive. The pain for non-EU regions is 
very small and by far not enough to enforce compliance with a global climate policy. 
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If the EU – in a stand-alone policy setting - would fully use the opportunities for CDM up to 
the limits proposed in ’20 20 in 2020’, the impacts on competitiveness and carbon leakage in 
2020 would be smaller. ETS-production would fall by 1.7%  and ETS-employment by 1.2%. 
Though foreign competitors would still increase their energy-intensive production, this increase 
is also in relative terms small, amounting to 25% of the production loss of EU-firms. 
Considering these modest impacts, one may conclude that the remedy of adopting border tax 
adjustments may not be worth the effort and worse than the disease.  
 
Whether border tax measures will be compatible with the rules of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) is unclear. It is controversial whether WTO-rules leave room for border measures based 
on the carbon print of a good. The WTO-environmental window might come to the relief: 
countries may deviate from the rules if it is for the protection of animal, plant or human health 
or for the conservation of natural resources. Even if border tax measures would appear ‘WTO-
proof’, feasibility to administer the measures and the possibility of retaliation deserve attention 
in the debate. 
 
Concerns about loss in competitiveness can be met by alternative policy measures, e.g. by 
recycling part of the revenues from auctioning ETS-emission rights directly to the sectors that 
are most exposed.    11 
1  Introduction 
The European Union has set a climate change target to achieve by 2020 a 20% reduction in EU 
greenhouse gas emissions as compared to 1990 levels, or 30% if other developed nations agree 
to take similar steps. The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is the backbone of the 
European policy. This cap-and-trade system will impose an implicit carbon tax on the 
combustion of fossil fuels in energy-intensive industries. There is some fear that European 
enterprises will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage with competitors based in 
countries that are not internalizing the climate costs. The competitiveness impact of EU climate 
policy can be particularly acute for energy-intensive manufacturers such as the iron and steel, 
aluminum, cement, glass, chemicals and pulp and paper industries. Carbon leakage may be 
another concern. Unilateral EU policy could induce emissions to increase elsewhere. Rather 
than reducing their emissions under a new EU climate policy, companies may consider to 
relocate to free-riding countries. Relocated firms may then actually emit more in, for example, 
China or India. While widely believed, this ‘pollution haven effect’ has proven difficult to 
demonstrate empirically. A few studies even find evidence for the Porter hypothesis; that 
regulation brings cost-reducing innovation. However, recent work by Levinson and Scott 
Taylor (2008) indicates that indeed industries, whose abatement costs increased most, 
experienced the largest increases in net imports. 
 
Border trade measures might be considered to alleviate the EU competitiveness concern. Such 
competitiveness provisions would essentially aim at leveling the playing field by imposing the 
same or similar costs, as EU climate policy imposes on domestic EU production. At the same 
time, border measures might also address the leakage concern. Within Europe, especially 
France has been quite active in promoting corrective measures. This study focuses on border tax 
adjustments (BTAs); the application of a domestic tax on imported goods while exempting 
exported goods from the tax in an effort to make the goods' price competitive both nationally 
and internationally. It should be noted, there are many ways to address competitiveness 
concerns, international agreement on collective action probably being the most desirable. In the 
current state of the debate, the EU allows for limited use of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). CDM allows EU-countries to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing 
countries as an alternative to more expensive emission reductions in their own countries.  
 
It is open for discussion whether the use of economic measures, including trade measures 
against other industrialized countries, would be effective, appropriate and legitimate for 
countries, or groups of them. There is an ample literature discussing the legitimacy of BTAs 
and climate policy (e.g., Cosbey and Tarasofsky, 2007; Pauwelyn, 2007). In contrast there are 
few empirical studies that have considered trade measures to ameliorate these negative 
competitive effects of unilateral climate policy. One example is Babiker and Rutherford (2005)   12 
discussing trade measures in the light of the Kyoto agreements. From this study it turns out that 
countervailing carbon levies can substantially reduce the welfare losses for the coalition 
members by shifting a great part of the carbon policy burden to the non-coalition members. 
In this paper we want to answer the following questions. 
 
·  Does unilateral climate policy by the EU lead to changes in competitiveness and relocation of 
energy-intensive industries to non-abating countries? 
·  Is there a case for trade measures to restore the level playing field? 
·  How would trade measures, in particular carbon import levies and export refunds mitigate the 
impacts of the climate policy? 
 
We use WorldScan, a multi-sector, multi-region, global general equilibrium model, to quantify the 
competitive effects and the scope for leakage under different climate scenarios and the impact 
of BTAs. We build upon earlier work (Boeters et al. , 2007; Wobst, 2007 ).  
 
The stage is set by two scenarios: GRAND COALITION and IMPASSE. These scenarios are stylized 
versions of current EU proposals. In GRAND COALITION a broad group of  important countries 
joins a common climate regime. The EU sets its emission target for 2020 at 30% below 1990 
levels.  Global emission trading allows for full flexibility. In the IMPASSE scenario Europe is 
virtually alone in climate change abatement. The EU target in 2020 lies 20% below 1990 levels.  
The EU-ETS allows for flexibility among energy-intensive sectors within the EU. CDM meets 
the worries about competitiveness in IMPASSE. To reflect the limited use of CDM in the current 
EU proposals, we analyze a variant on IMPASSE that includes CDM up to the limits proposed.  
To assess the impact  of BTAs, we build upon the scenario with the largest impacts on EU-
competitiveness and carbon leakage: IMPASSE without CDM. We analyze variants on IMPASSE 
with levies on energy-intensive EU imports and refunds on energy-intensive EU exports. An 
alternative scenario is added in which part of the revenues from auctioning emission permits are 
recycled to vulnerable energy-intensive sectors. 
 
Before discussing empirical results, first, we examine some pros and cons of border tax 
measures and discuss its legitimacy (section 2). Next, we briefly explain the policy simulations 
and the methodology used (section 3). Simulation results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
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2  A case for trade measures?  
In the climate context, trade measures are likely to be justified by the need to offset any 
competitive advantage held by producers in countries that have not implemented costly 
mitigation measures (Stokke, 2004). To level the playing field on world markets, the EU might 
consider border tax adjustments (BTAs). BTAs are taxes imposed on imports or tax-relief 
granted to exports, used to level the playing field between taxed domestic industries and 
untaxed competitors abroad. The focus in this study is on BTAs.  However, competitiveness 
concerns may be addressed by alternatives like: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
grandfathering emission rights or exemptions for energy-intensive sectors. Revenues raised by 
auctioning emission permits could also be used to lower other costs such as taxes on labor or 
capital, or technology development and application costs (cross-subsidization). Although the 
immediate demand for trade measures is economic in nature, there may be other, environmental 
reasons. A BTA would raise the prices of at least all those goods that enter the EU market to 
levels reflecting the social cost of carbon. Thus, carbon leakage may be reduced. 
  
As noted by the 2006 Stern Review (Stern, 2006), unilateral trade barriers “are clearly second 
best to implementing a similar carbon price across the global economy” through international 
agreements. One must, therefore, remain aware of the costs and risks of trade measures. 
Barriers to trade are inefficient. Trade restrictions skew the optimal allocation of the world’s 
resources and the principle of comparative advantage. They are also costly especially for EU 
consumers and EU industries that depend on imported inputs. The competitiveness impact can 
be exaggerated and abused. Even where trade barriers may be needed as second or third best 
solutions, competitiveness provisions risk being abused by import-competing EU industries for 
purely protectionist purposes unrelated to global warming. BTAs may undermine the trust 
necessary for future international cooperation and agreement on emission reductions.  
Furthermore, the administration of competitiveness provisions is likely to be complex and 
costly. 
Politicians, economists and environmentalists have periodically promoted BTAs. The Stern 
review emphasized that the cost of inaction will be considerably greater than the cost of taking 
action to mitigate climate change. For this reason, it is important to forcefully pursue all 
possible courses of action, including BTAs. Also Stiglitz has called for a carbon tax or trade 
measures against countries not cutting carbon emissions (Stiglitz, 2006). The subject hit the EU 
agenda when its High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy & Environment advised the 
European Commission on the long-term energy future (EU, 2007). Some were concerned over 
repercussions on free trade; others felt the issue needed serious study. There is evidence of 
differences in opinion within the EU Commission. On the one hand, enterprise Commissioner 
Verheugen (Enterprise and Industry) asked Commission President Barroso to explore   14 
possibilities including border tax adjustments.  On the other hand, Trade Commissioner 
Mandelson considers them as problematic under current WTO rules, and almost impossible to 
implement in practice. He said “It would also be bad politics. A punitive approach to pursuing 
international cooperation on climate change would be politically and strategically clumsy, 
igniting a carbon war” (Mandelson, 2006). The French government has also demanded the 
introduction of a BTA. France will produce its own proposal for a BTA – a so-called ‘Eco-
Duty’, which it intends to circulate at EU level for EU approval. Concerns about 
competitiveness are widespread. In the USA senators Lieberman and Warner introduced 
America’s Climate Security Act. This bill exemplifies the intention of U.S. Congress to start 
fighting climate change while at the same time protecting U.S. industry from any competitive 
disadvantage through border tax adjustments. 
Risk of a WTO challenge 
Import tariffs are regarded by some as a form of protectionism, and thus may not be compatible 
with international trade regulations. Any measure with a serious trade impact is likely to trigger 
a WTO complaint. The WTO consistency of such provisions is, therefore, crucial.  
It can be argued that WTO rules on border tax adjustment permit the imposition of a tax on 
imports as long as such a tax is equivalent to the tax or other charge imposed on domestic EU 
products. The flip-side of the right to impose a domestic tax on imports is the right to deduct the 
same tax on domestic products that get exported. Under WTO rules, such rebates are not 
considered to be prohibited export subsidies. BTAs of this kind are permitted under the WTO 
rules, but the extent to which they can apply to energy or carbon inputs is unclear. Is border 
adjustment limited to “product” measures or does it extend also to “process” measures? This 
raises fundamental debates, still not completely resolved, as to whether the WTO permits 
distinctions based on the method by which a good is produced, rather than just on the product as 
such. Unlike product taxes, process taxes ‘by and large cannot’ be adjusted at the border. Most 
controversial by far would be the imposition of trade restrictions on imports based on the 
carbon or other greenhouse gases that were emitted in their production abroad.  
 
Authors of the New Economics Foundation report (New Economics Foundation, 2003) have 
examined the question “whether implementing trading barriers to climate-change policy is 
possible?” They have convincingly shown that the European Union does have a good chance to 
win any possible dispute over such a border tax. Climate related trade restrictive measures are 
countervailing duties. The WTO allows states to impose these countervailing duties to offset the 
competitive trade advantage that foreign companies gain when they receive subsidies from their 
government. In the case of climate change, the US government and other governments of non-
complying nations are not giving direct subsidies but indirectly favor their industries by not   15 
imposing climate policy constraints on them. The use of remedial trade restrictions is allowed in 
particular where there has been ‘a good faith effort to reach an international agreement’. 
Even if border adjustments were permitted for EU climate policy, that is not the end of the 
story.  A carbon tax must meet the substantive test. This test essentially requires that imported 
products are not treated less favorably than similar domestic products. The issue is primarily 
whether, for example, steel from China made with coal (subject to a high carbon tax or 
regulation) is “similar to” domestically produced EU steel using natural gas (subject to a lower 
carbon tax or regulation). A BTA  must also avoid discrimination between imports from 
different countries. This follows from the so-called “most-favored-nation” (MFN) obligation.  
The use of tariff or other trade restrictions to induce compliance with the EU climate regime 
would be difficult to justify under present WTO regulation.  One can only assume that a 
complete ban on imports from countries that do not have carbon restrictions in place is not on 
the table, unless such violation could be justified under the environmental exceptions, any 
punitive “carbon tariff” would violate WTO rules. 
Whether a BTA would be permitted under GATT/WTO regulations is uncertain. There are no 
clear regulations in the WTO. Above all, whether elements not physically present in the final 
product can be taxed is hotly debated. Given the vague nature of WTO law, the WTO may 
either uphold or strike down the provision. WTO-bodies have so far been restrictive regarding 
the exceptions in WTO agreements to the general ban on embargoes and discrimination. 
Although there are certain options to be avoided as they would violate WTO law (e.g. anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy duties), the broader WTO consistency of such process-based 
restrictions is unclear and remains to be tested. 
 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the following guidelines should be kept in mind for a 
carbon border tax to qualify as a “border tax adjustment”. To limit the impact on trade, only a 
limited list of imports of energy intensive products should be covered; studies indicate that only 
for these products competitiveness concerns may arise; the administration of a carbon tax on 
imports, and the problem of determining the carbon footprint of goods produced abroad, would 
also be much easier if it applies only to some basic products (such as iron and steel, aluminum, 
cement, bulk glass, paper and a number of chemicals) and not to finished goods (such as cars, 
consumer goods and durables or drugs). The carbon tax on imports must be “equivalent” to the 
internal cost imposed by EU climate policy.    16 
Environmental window 
The ‘environmental window’ of the global trade regime might provide an escape if (i) the WTO 
would not permit BTAs for a process-based tax or charge or (ii) the WTO does permit BTAs 
but the adjustment is found to discriminate imports. Any violation may still be justified under 
the environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX as a measure: “relating to the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption” (the environmental window). The 
relevance of uncoordinated, i.e. unilateral, trade measures, for environmental purposes has been 
debated extensively for decades. Especially the United States has been active in implementing 
unilateral trade measures justified by environmental goals. (Tarasofsky, 2005).  Whereas pre-
1995 GATT panels never found that a measure met the exceptions in this article, Post-1995 
WTO jurisprudence has proven to be much more flexible and “greener”. The WTO accepted a 
French ban on imports of asbestos for health protection. The most famous case of a trade 
measure is that taken by the US in the ‘shrimp-turtle’ case. The WTO found that a US ban on 
shrimp based on how these shrimp were caught abroad was justified as a conservation measure 
for endangered turtles. 
 
The most crucial requirement is likely to be the introductory phrase of the ‘environmental 
window’. It requires essentially that the carbon tax on imports is flexible and varies in a way 
that takes account of local conditions in foreign countries exporting to the European Union. In 
case a carbon tax would need justification under the environmental window, two adjustments in 
particular would need to be made (Pauwelyn, 2007);  
·  A sliding scale based on efforts to fight climate change in the exporting country: taking account 
of  carbon taxes or export taxes in the exporting country; 
·  A sliding scale based on the stage of economic development of the exporting country: given 
that many international agreements recognize that developing countries ought to carry a lighter 
burden in the fight against global warming.  
 
   17 
3  Methodology 
WorldScan 
The macroeconomic consequences of climate policy scenarios are assessed using the applied 
general equilibrium model WorldScan. This model has global coverage and in particular details 
regions within Europe (see Lejour et al., 2006, and Bollen, Manders and Mulder, 2004). With 
respect to climate policies, two general categories of regions are distinguished: developed 
countries, referred to as Annex I countries and developing countries, referred to as Non-Annex I 
countries. 
 
WorldScan data for the base year 2001 are to a large extent taken from the GTAP-6 database 
(Dimanaran and McDougall, 2006) that contains integrated data on bilateral trade flows and 
input-output accounts for 57 sectors and 87 countries and regions. A more disaggregated sector  





     
Netherlands  Cereals  Factors 
EU-15 (old member states)  Oilseeds    Low-skilled labour 
EU-12 (new member states)  Sugar crops    High-skilled labour 
Other Europe  Other agriculture    Capital 
Former Soviet Union  Minerals    Land  
United States   Oil    Natural resources 
Other OECD (ex  Mexico)  Coal   
Brazil   Petroleum and coal products  Primary energy carriers 
Mexico, Central and other Latin  Am.  Natural gas     Coal 
Middle East and North Africa  Electricity     Petroleum, coal products 
China and Hong Kong  Ferrous metals    Natural gas 
India   Chemical, rubber, plastic products    Modern biomass 
Other South and South -East Asia  Mineral products    Renewables 
Rest of World   Paper products, publishing   
  Non-ferrous metals  Other intermediates 
  Vegetable oils and fats    Cereals 
  Other consumer goods    Oilseeds 
  Capital goods and durables    Sugar crops 
  Road and rail transport    Other agriculture 
  Other transport    Minerals 
  Other services    Oil 
  Biodiesel    Electricity 
  Ethanol    Ferrous metals 
  Modern biomass    Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
  Renewables    Mineral products 
      Paper products, publishing 
      Non-ferrous metals 
      Vegetable oils and fats 
      Other consumer goods 
      Capital goods and durables 
      Road and rail transport 
      Other transport 
      Other services 
      Biodiesel 
      Ethanol 
a) non-Annex I regions are denoted in italics  
b) ETS-sectors and inputs denoted in bold 
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classification is used in WorldScan that permits the assessments to come as close as possible to 
the sectors that are currently subject to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The version 
of WorldScan used for this study distinguishes 25 markets for goods and services and factor 
markets for labour, capital, land and natural resources in each of the selected 14 countries and 
regions (see Table 3.1).  
Five primary energy carries are distinguished: coal, petroleum and coal products, natural 
gas, modern biomass and  renewables. Only the first three of these contribute to the CO2-
emissions simulated by the model. The following six sectors are assumed to be covered by the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS): Electricity, Ferrous metals, Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products, Mineral products, Paper products, publishing and Non-ferrous metals. There is no 
perfect match, though. Emissions issued by the combustion of fossil fuels in the sectors 
Electricity and Ferrous metals can be considered to be fully subject to the EU-ETS emission 
ceiling, but this assumption may not hold for the remaining sectors that comprise also activities 
that are not covered by EU-ETS (such as publishing as opposed to paper production). 
Policy cases 
In this study we assess seven stylized policy variants. We consider a reference case (IMPASSE), 
in which we implement no border adjustment. IMPASSE describes a stand-alone EU climate 
policy with very minor mitigation efforts in other industrialized countries. It should be noted 
that in IMPASSE no CDM is allowed for. This reference case will be compared with an 
alternative policy environment in 2020: GRAND COALITION. GRAND COALITION shows the 
impacts of an ambitious global mitigation effort, including large fast-growing countries as 
China, India and Brazil. Both IMPASSE and GRAND COALITION are associated with the two most 
extreme scenario’s that were developed for the Interdepartmental Policy Research ‘Future 
climate policy’ (Boeters et al., 2007). For this study both scenario’s have been brought in line 
with the ’20 20 in 2020’ proposals of the European Commission. According to these the EU 
will impose in 2020 a ceiling on greenhouse gas emissions of 20% below the 1990 level (or 
30% if a broad coalition of countries embarks on abating global warming), a targeted 20% share 
of renewable energy in total energy use and a 10% biofuel share in road fuel use  
 
To assess the implications of border adjustments we assess three policy cases in which specific 
adjustment measures are combined with the climate regime to protect the energy intensive 
industry in the EU member states. These measures are carbon levies, refunds or a combination 
of both. 
 
In addition, two alternatives are considered. We consider an IMPASSE scenario, including use of  
CDM. CDM allows EU-countries to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing 
countries as an alternative to more expensive emission reductions in their own countries. CDM   19 
meets the worries about competitiveness in IMPASSE. Actually this scenario reflects the limited 
use allowed in the current EU proposals. RECYCLING answers the current debate about 
distribution of revenues from auctioning emission permits in ETS.  
 
IMPASSE  IMPASSE describes a stand-alone EU climate policy with half-hearted 
mitigation efforts elsewhere; in this scenario meeting the EU 
temperature  objective (to limit global warming during this century 
to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels) is extremely 
improbable. The EU 20% renewables target is imposed by 
subsidizing the use of renewables and allowing for green certificate 
trade among member states. Adoption of a 10% share of biofuels in 
road fuel use contributes to the overall renewables target.  
GRAND COALITION   GRAND COALITION, on the other hand, shows the impacts of a global 
mitigation effort that has a reasonable chance to meet the  EU 
temperature objective; in GRAND COALITION the overall targets for 
renewables from IMPASSE are imposed in volume terms 
IMPASSE + LEVY  The third policy variant (LEVY) combines IMPASSE with a tax levied 
on the embodied carbon of the energy-intensive imports (ETS-
sectors) into the EU-27 assessed at the prevailing carbon tax rates 
and the carbon content of domestic production. 
IMPASSE + REFUND  The refund case is a variant where in IMPASSE the EU-27 energy 
intensive exports (ETS-sectors) get a full refund of the carbon tax at 
the point of shipment. 
IMPASSE + LEVY + REFUND This variant combines an import tariff (LEVY) and an export subsidy 
(REFUND) in IMPASSE. 
IMPASSE + CDM  This variant allows for CDM up to the limits proposed  by the 
European Commission in ’20 20 in 2020’  
IMPASSE+RECYCLING  This variant assumes that 80% of the auctioning receipts from 
exposed ETS-sectors (ferrous metals, chemical products, paper 
products, non-ferrous metals) is recycled directly to these industries. 
 
We observe here, that if post-2012 climate change negotiations would fail to bring a coalition 
that is both determined to abate global warming and broad enough to be effective in reaching 
this goal, IMPASSE + CDM  would come closest to the current ’20 20 in 2020’ policy proposal.  
Instead we use IMPASSE without CDM as the reference scenario for an assessment of the 
impacts of BTAs, simply because the analysis of these impacts would become quite amorphous 
if we would choose the more relevant reference of IMPASSE + CDM. In the latter scenario the 
policy impacts on EU competitiveness and carbon leakage are too small to enable a clear-cut 
analysis of  BTAs.   20 
Baseline 
The effects of climate policy depend strongly on the underlying baseline. All counterfactual 
analyses depart from a so-called middle-course scenario without climate policy that has also 
been used in Boeters et al., 2007 and was developed by PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (Van Vuuren et al., 2006). This scenario is based on estimates of trends, 
and is comparable to the reference scenario used by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
the so-called B2 scenario used by the IPCC. According to this baseline scenario, global 
population will continue to expand. Combined with a worldwide economic growth of around 
3% per year, the global demand for energy will increase significantly: a 50% increase in 2020 
relative to 2001. This expansion will primarily take place in the nations currently known as 
developing countries, which will thus partially reduce the gap in energy consumption per capita 
with the industrialized countries. Table 3.2 gives some key characteristics on the baseline for 
the 2001-2020 period.  
 
Energy prices in the baseline differ significantly from current prices. Baseline values depart 
from the relatively low energy prices in 2001 baseyear. The baseline shows a gradual rise in 
energy prices over time due to depletion of resources. In 2020 the oil price amounts to about 25 
US$/barrel. It remains to be seen whether current three digit oil prices are permanent, but taking 
account of a higher oil price seems inevitable. In the near future, we will update the baseline in 
this respect. 
Table 3.2  Characteristics of baseline scenario, average annual growth, 2001-2020 
             







intensity  CO2 intensity 
             
  %  %  %  %  %  % 
             
Annex I  0.3  2.7  1.1  1.1  -1.5  0.0 
    EU-27  0.0  2.3  1.0  1.1  -1.3  0.1 
    USA  0.9  2.9  0.7  0.7  -2.2  0.1 
 Former Soviet Union  -0.2  6.1  1.7  1.3  -4.2  -0.3 
    Other  0.6  2.6  1.6  1.6  -0.9  -0.1 
             
Non-Annex I  1.3  5.4  3.5  3.2  -1.8  -0.3 
    China  0.6  7.8  2.6  2.6  -4.8  0.0 
    India  1.5  5.7  4.1  3.9  -1.5  -0.1 
    Brazil  1.2  3.5  2.2  1.9  -1.3  -0.3 
    Other  1.6  4.5  4.0  3.5  -0.5  -0.5 
             
World  1.1  3.3  2.1  2.0  -1.2  -0.1 
a) Total of coal, refinery products, natural gas, biofuels, commercial biomass and renewable energy  
Source: WorldScan 
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4  Results 
4.1  Impasse 
Against the background of the baseline, the IMPASSE policy scenario has been developed as a 
reference policy. IMPASSE describes a strong EU climate policy, only modest efforts by other 
Annex I parties and no action by non-Annex I countries. There is emission trading between 
energy intensive sectors (ETS) within the EU-27. Hence, ETS allows for some flexibility. In 
this stylized scenario there is no CDM.  
Table 4.1  IMPASSE without CDM, 2020 
           
  Percentage CO2 reduction  Emission price
a)  National income 
           












   




           
Annex I  6  -9  -9  9  -0.3 
    EU-27  -14  -28  -28  52  -0.7 
        EU-15  -18  -32  -27  29  -0.7 
        EU-12  5  -8  -30  2  -1.3 
    USA  13  -2  -2  2  -0.1 
Former Soviet Union  7  -2  -2  2  -0.6 
    Other  20  -2  -2  1  0.0 
                
Non-Annex I  55  -  0  -  -0.1 
    China  42  -  1  -  -0.1 
    India  62  -  -1  -  -0.3 
    Brazil  41  -  0  -  -0.4 
    Other  65  -  1  -  -0.1 
                
World  25  -  -5  5  -0.3 
a) For EU-27 ETS-price, for member states non-ETS national carbon tax, for other Annex-I countries national carbon tax 
Source: WorldScan 
 
The outcomes for IMPASSE show an emission reduction of 5% compared to the baseline in 2020 
at the global level at a cost of 0.3% of world national income (see Table 4.1). It is hardly 
surprising that for EU-27 the costs are - at 0.7% of national income - considerably larger. 
Driven by the strong EU efforts, emissions reduction for Annex I amounts to almost 9% below 
the baseline level.  Emissions elsewhere increase with almost 0.5%, reflecting carbon leakage. 
International permit trade is only operational for the ETS-sectors within the EU, at an emission 
price of 52 €/tCO2. Within the ETS, the old member states (EU-15) are a net permit importer 
from the new member states (EU-12). For EU-15 actual emissions in 2020 are 27% below 
baseline, while the target for EU-15 lies 32% below baseline. National carbon taxes that are 
needed to curb emissions in non-ETS vary a lot over member states (29 €/tCO2in EU-15 versus 
a mere 2 €/tCO2in EU-12).   22 
As a result of the tight EU emissions ceiling in ETS-sectors both domestic (-2.8%) and export 
demand (-9.1%) decline in EU-27 (see Table 4.2).  Moreover, as domestic production becomes 
less competitive imports from other regions increase (8.1% in EU-27). Hence, EU production 
falls more than domestic demand (-4.5% in EU-27). Most non-EU regions increase their 
production. Yet, at the global level, aggregate ETS-production remains below baseline (-0.6%). 
Table 4.2  IMPASSE without CDM; employment, production, import, export and domestic us of ETS-sectors, 
% difference with baseline, 2020 
           
  Employment  Production  Imports a)  Exports a)  Domestic use 
           
Annex I  -0.7  -1.3  3.4  -2.9  -1.0 
    EU-27  -3.2  -4.5  8.1  -9.1  -2.8 
        EU-15   -2.4  -3.9  5.4  -7.0  -2.5 
        EU-12  -5.5  -8.3  5.2  -12.9  -5.1 
    USA  0.4  0.3  -2.2  1.5  0.0 
    Former Soviet Union  1.4  0.9  -7.9  4.9  -0.2 
    Other  0.6  0.2  -1.9  1.1  -0.3 
                
Non-Annex I  0.6  0.6  -2.9  3.4  0.1 
    China  0.2  0.3  -1.4  2.0  0.0 
    India  0.4  0.5  -2.2  2.1  0.2 
    Brazil  0.6  0.4  -2.4  0.3  0.0 
    Other  1.1  1.1  -2.5  2.7  0.3 
                
World  0.4  -0.6  -  -  -0.6 
a) Excluding intraregional trade 
Source: WorldScan 
 
Employment in ETS-sectors decreases in the EU with 3.2% (see Table 4.2) and rises in all other 
countries, especially in the Former Soviet Union (+1.4%). In absolute terms the shift in 
employment is modest, given the small share of ETS in total employment. The baseline 
employment share of ETS is 8.9% in 2020. It should be noted that in the version of WorldScan 
used here, labour supply and unemployment are exogenous. Thus, the decline of employment in 
ETS (-3.2%) is compensated by an increase in employment in non-ETS (+0.3%).  
 
Behind the production decrease at aggregate ETS-level in EU-27 of 4.5% there is considerable 
variation at the individual sector level in EU-27 (see Table 4.3). The simulation outcomes show 
largest reductions in production and employment for electricity, non-ferrous and ferrous metals 
while the decrease is most modest for the sector ‘Paper products, publishing’. Obviously, 
individual plants within these sectors may be affected differently than the average impacts 
indicate. In addition the average impacts may underestimate the negative consequences for 
some sectors where the classification exceeds the boundaries of ETS. For example, within 
‘Paper products, publishing’  paper mills do belong to the ETS but publishing does not. Hence, 
the decline of production in paper mills may be larger than the 0.8% that is  
recorded for ‘Paper products, publishing’.   23 
Table 4.3  IMPASSE without CDM; impacts by ETS-sector, % differences  with baseline, EU-27, 2020 
           
  Employment  Production   Imports
a)  Exports
a)  Domestic use 
           
  Electricity  -8.8  -8.1  91.9  -51.0  -5.6 
  Ferrous metals  -3.6  -6.1  10.7  -12.5  -4.2 
  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  -3.2  -4.7  5.7  -8.2  -2.8 
  Mineral products  -1.1  -3.2  7.1  -8.3  -2.2 
  Paper products, publishing  -0.2  -0.8  1.4  -2.5  -0.6 
  Non-ferrous metals  -3.6  -6.0  6.2  -10.5  -2.8 
  All ETS-sectors  -3.2  -4.5  8.1  -9.1  -2.8 
  Non-ETS sectors  0.3  0.3  -2.5  0.9  0.0 
a) Excluding intraregional trade 
Source: WorldScan 
 
The increase of imports and the decline of exports are larger than average in electricity and 
ferrous metals. The sweeping changes in electricity trade do not imply large trading volumes, as 
electricity is hardly traded. In the baseline both exports and imports amount to a mere 1.5% of 
total demand. 
Leakage 
Carbon leakage may occur via three channels: induced exports of energy-intensive products 
from countries with more modest carbon policies, relocation of polluting activities to countries 
where taxation is lower and increased fossil energy use in non-coalition members because of a 
decrease in primary fossil energy prices.  We define the carbon leakage rate as the increase of 
emissions in non-coalition members (with respect to the baseline) as a percentage of the 
emission reduction by the coalition members (with respect to the baseline).  In IMPASSE carbon 
leakage is 3.3% in 2020 and occurring in China and Other Non-Annex I (see Table 4.4). Given 
the (mild) cap, there is no carbon leakage to the other countries of Annex I. In a variant of 
IMPASSE, with USA and other non-EU regions not complying to any emission targets, carbon 
leakage more than doubles.  
Table 4.4  IMPASSE without CDM, carbon leakage and production leakage by sector
a), 2020 
   
  Carbon leakage 
a)  3.3 
  Production leakage 
b):   
  Electricity  17 
  Ferrous metals  30 
  Chemical, rubber, plastic products  52 
  Mineral products  40 
  Paper products, publishing  26 
  Non-ferrous metals  45 
  All ETS-sectors  38 
a) Non-Annex I emissions increase over the baseline as a % of Annex I emissions decrease below baseline 
b) Non-EU-27 production increase over the baseline as a % of EU-27 production decline below  baseline 
Source: WorldScan  
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In table 4.4 we also show so-called production leakage rates for ETS-sectors and for aggregate 
non-ETS in EU-27. Production leakages may occur via the very same channels that cause 
carbon leakage: import penetration by lower cost producers, production relocation from higher 
cost producers and production expansion by non-members due to decreased primary energy 
costs. Similar to the carbon leakage rate we indicate the production leakage rate by the increase 
of production outside the EU as a percentage of the reduction of production within the EU.  On 
average, ETS leakage amounts to almost 40%. This means that almost two fifths of the 
production decline in EU-ETS is compensated by a production increase elsewhere. This 
amounts to 1.8% of EU baseline ETS production. At the level of individual sectors leakage is 
smallest for electricity (17%) because the opportunities for electricity trade are minor. EU 
electricity trade is almost completely confined to trade with Other Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union.  
There are several reasons why the ETS production leakage rate (38%) is much higher than the 
carbon leakage rate (3.3%). First, carbon leakage can only occur in non-Annex I as all Annex I 
parties impose some emissions ceiling in IMPASSE. Carbon leakage would double to 6.7% in 
IMPASSE if the emission ceilings in all other Annex-I countries would be lifted.  Second, the 
output of ETS-sectors is – with the exception of electricity and cement - easily traded 
internationally. The output of some other sectors (such as road and rail transport) must take 
place within the EU and the trade substitute does not apply. Finally, import substitution cannot 
compensate for emissions reduction in residential consumption (heat, power, and road fuels) 
either. 
4.2  Grand Coalition 
GRAND COALITION shows the impacts of a global mitigation effort that has a reasonable chance 
to limit global warming during this century to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (the 
EU objective). The costs of significant emissions reductions remain limited because emissions 
trading is used on a large scale. Not just the countries with absolute targets (Annex I), but also 
the nations with relative targets (China, India and Brazil) use emissions trading, at least for the 
energy-intensive sectors. The outcomes for GRAND COALITION at the global level show an 
emission reduction of 22% in 2020 compared to the baseline at a cost of 0.4% of world national 
income (see Table 4.5). The costs to EU-27 amount to 0.7% of national income. Within the 
global coalition Annex I countries in general reduce emissions to a smaller extent than targeted 
(EU-12 and the Former Soviet Union being the exceptions), buying permits from non-Annex I 
countries, especially from China and India against an international permit price of 18 €/tCO2. 
Though the reduction target of EU member states are more stringent in GRAND COALITION (-
30% with respect to 1990) than in IMPASSE (-20% with respect to 1990) the income loss for EU-
27 is slightly less in GRAND COALITION.  The income loss for EU-15 (-0.6%) is less than in   25 
IMPASSE (-0.7%) while the loss to EU-12 (-2.2%) is considerably larger than in IMPASSE (-
1.3%). The cause of this divergence in income developments between the old and new member 
states is permit trade. EU-15 is an importer of permits and quadruples its volume of permit 
imports in GRAND COALITION at a price that is 65% lower than in IMPASSE.  Conversely, in 
GRAND COALITION EU-12 is unable to compete with other exporters of emissions permits and 
has to reduce its export volume by 80%. 
It should be noted that these outcomes depend on the assumption that the overall renewables 
targets of GRAND COALITION are kept at the levels of IMPASSE. If instead a target of a 20% 
share of renewable energy in total energy would have been imposed the income loss to EU-27 
would rise above IMPASSE to 0.9% of national income. Compared to IMPASSE total energy use is 
higher in GRAND COALITION and thus also renewable energy use. The progressive marginal 
costs of renewable energy are the cause of the additional income loss if the target for 
renewables would have been applied in percentage terms. 
Table 4.5  GRAND COALITION, 2020 
  Percentage CO2 reduction  Emission price  National income 
           
 





compared     
 




 to baseline 
emissions 2020     




           
Annex I  -25  -36  -18  18  -0.5 
    EU-27  -25  -37  -17  18  -0.7 
        EU-15  -29  -41  -16  18  -0.6 
        EU-12  -10  -21  -26  18  -2.2 
    USA  -33  -43  -19  18  -0.4 
 Former Soviet Union  15  5  -21  18  -0.3 
    Other  -46  -54  -15  18  -0.4 
                
Non-Annex I  12  -  -28  13  -0.1 
    China  27  -10  -51  18  0.1 
    India  56  -5  -36  18  -0.1 
    Brazil  28  -10  -15  18  -0.5 
    Other  47  -  -11  10  -0.1 
                
World  2  -  -22  16  -0.4 
Source: WorldScan  
 
EU employment in ETS-sectors exceeds the baseline (+0.4%) whereas employment decreases 
everywhere else (see also Table 4.6). In contrast with IMPASSE supply and demand are 
especially reduced in non-Annex I countries and in the Former Soviet Union, where major 
reductions take place in return for permit payment transfers from Annex I. Supply and demand 
are exceeding baseline levels in the countries of EU-15. This outcome indicates that ETS-
industries in EU-15 are able to meet their (most stringent) emissions reduction target by 
purchasing emissions reductions elsewhere. Moreover, as production costs increase almost 
everywhere they do not face increased import competition.   26 
4.3  Border tax adjustments 
Both levies and refunds restore loss in competitiveness to a certain extent. We report the effects 
of border tax adjustments (BTAs) in ETS-sectors on employment, welfare and carbon leakage. 
Table 4.6  Employment in ETS-sectors, differences (in % of baseline) with IMPASSE,  2020 
 
GRAND 
COALITION  IMPASSE  LEVY  REFUNDS  LEVY + REFUNDS 
           
  % differences  with baseline  differences (in % of baseline) with IMPASSE 
Annex I  -0.4  -0.7  0.1  0.3  0.4 
    EU-27  0.4  -3.2  0.8  1.4  2.3 
        EU-15  0.7  -2.4  0.8  1.6  2.6 
        EU-12  -0.6  -5.5  0.7  0.8  1.6 
    USA  -0.3  0.4  -0.2  -0.3  -0.6 
    Former Soviet Union  -2.4  1.4  -0.3  -0.4  -0.8 
    Other  -0.1  0.6  -0.6  -0.4  -1.0 
           
Non-Annex I  -1.1  0.6  -0.2  -0.4  -0.6 
    China  -0.5  0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 
    India  -5.1  0.4  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4 
    Brazil  -1.8  0.6  -0.2  -0.9  -1.1 
    Other  -0.3  1.1  -0.4  -0.5  -1.0 
           
World  -1.0  0.4  -0.2  -0.2  -0.4 
Source: WorldScan  
 
Compared to the reference case of IMPASSE, levies improve employment in ETS sectors in EU-
27 by 0.8%; refunds improve employment by 1.4% (see Table 4.6). The combined effect of 
levies and refunds is 2.3%. Given the initial employment loss in IMPASSE of 3.2% in ETS-
sectors, an employment loss remains that reflects reduced demands in the EU. The employment 
gain in the LEVY and REFUND case is paid for by foreign producers. Compared to IMPASSE, 
energy intensive employment in all non-EU regions declines with both EU import levies and 
export refunds. Producers in regions that benefited most in IMPASSE suffer the largest losses 
from BTAs. Given the fact that the EU is a net exporter of energy intense goods, creating a 
level-playing-field for exports (REFUND) has larger employment effects than an import tariff 
(LEVY). 
 
Focusing on specific sectors within the ETS-aggregate, it appears that under BTA’s 
employment rises in all energy-intensive sectors. The changes are most pronounced outside the 
electricity sector (see Figure 4.1). The rise of employment within ETS is at the expense of 
employment in non-ETS however, as total employment is exogenous in the model. 
   27 





















  all ETS-
sectors
grand coalition levy+refund refund levy Impasse without CDM  
From an overall perspective of the EU, the LEVY case is welfare improving compared to the 
reference case (IMPASSE). The REFUND case is welfare worsening. However the effects are 
small (see Table 4.7). For EU-27 in LEVY welfare improves by 0.03% relative to IMPASSE. 
Revenues from import tariffs and the positive terms-of-trade effect (foreign producers have to 
lower their prices), more than compensates the producer’s and consumer’s loss due to the tariff. 
In REFUND welfare decreases by 0.05% relative to IMPASSE. The public spending on refunds 
causes the welfare loss.  
Table 4.7  Welfare, ETS-price and carbon leakage in EU-27, 2020 
 
GRAND 
COALITION  IMPASSE  LEVY  REFUND 
LEVIES + 
REFUND 
           
  % differences  with baseline  differences (in % of baseline) with IMPASSE 
Welfare  -0.69  -0.72  0.03  -0.05  -0.02 
           
  € / tCO2  % differences with IMPASSE 
ETS-price   18  52  6  7  14 
           
  %  differences with IMPASSE 
Carbon leakage   1.0  3.3  -1.4  -1.3  -2.8 
Source: WorldScan 
 
Import levies are welfare worsening for non-Annex I. The effect is small, however. Trade 
measures are unlikely to persuade non-abating countries to join a climate coalition: they are not 
a credible threat to non-abating countries. On average, income losses for non-Annex I in 
GRAND COALITION are larger than in IMPASSE (-0.4% versus -0.3%). Import levies impose extra 
costs on non-complying countries, but not enough to tip the balance. Theoretically speaking, it   28 
is possible to raise import duties to a level where they may be more harmful to outsiders.  It 
seems unlikely that WTO-agreements allow for these extreme measures. 
 
In the LEVY case the ETS-price rises by 6% compared to IMPASSE. In the REFUND case there is a 
7% increase in the emission price. Restoring imports and exports gives a boost to production in 
ETS-sectors. Emission prices have to rise to keep emissions at the ETS-target. 
BTAs not only restore the level-playing-field for ETS-sectors. These measures also help to limit 
carbon leakage. Both tariffs and refunds decrease leakage by more than 1%-point. Jointly 
applying import tariffs and refunds decreases leakage from 3.3% to 0.5%. 
4.4  Recycling and CDM 
An alternative to BTAs is to meet the worries of ETS-sectors by recycling part of the revenues 
from auctioning emissions permits. In IMPASSE + RECYCLING we assume that 80% of the permit 
auction receipts from the most exposed  ETS-industries (ferrous metals, chemical products, 
paper products, non-ferrous metals) are recycled to these industries in the form of an output 
subsidy. It is to be noted that this form of recycling can also be seen as an alternative to 
grandfathering part of the permits to exposed industries. When recycling rules would be the 
same in all member states one could circumvent certain disadvantages of grandfathering, such 
as: international and intersectoral disparities in the allocation of free permits, recurring 
cumbersome allocation processes and internationally divergent rules for firm entry and exit in 
the industries concerned. Compared to lump-sum redistribution of auction revenues in IMPASSE, 
ETS-targeted recycling is slightly welfare decreasing. Recycling partly makes up for the carbon 
tax. ETS-price has to go up to keep emissions below the ETS-ceiling. Carbon leakage decreases 
by 0.7%-points and employment is 1.6%-points higher than in IMPASSE. 
 
CDM takes the sharp edge of a unilateral climate regime like IMPASSE. CDM allows EU-
countries to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries as an alternative to 
more expensive emission reductions in their own countries.  In the ’20 20 in 2020’ proposal of 
the European Commission the use that can be made of carbon credits from CDM is limited, 
however. We have adopted these constraints and assumed that for ETS-sectors at most one third 
of the yearly reduction efforts (baseline minus target) may be covered by CDM-credits, while 
the yearly CDM-ceiling for non-ETS is 3% of 2005 emissions.  
 
IMPASSE  + CDM  lowers the emission price considerably and thereby the mitigation costs (see 
table 4.8). The average emission price in ETS-sectors amounts to 27 €/tCO2 (-58%). If CDM 
would not have been allowed, the ETS price would rise to 52 €/tCO2. If the economy can rely 
on inexpensive abatement options, the welfare loss from the climate policy declines. In IMPASSE   29 
+ CDM welfare loss is 0.02%-points less than in IMPASSE. The limited use of CDM reduces 
carbon leakage by 3%-points. For the EU as a whole employment impacts in ETS-sectors are 
lower as well. CDM mitigates the employment loss in IMPASSE with 2%-points, compared to 
IMPASSE (compared to the baseline an employment loss of 1.2% remains). It should be noted 
that new EU member states suffer from CDM projects. The old member states will partly buy 
credits from CDM-projects in non-Annex I, instead of emissions permits from the new member 
states. With CDM welfare loss for new member countries (EU-12) rises to 1.6%, compared to 
1.2% in IMPASSE without CDM.  
Table 4.8  Welfare, ETS-price, carbon leakage and employment in ETS-sectors, EU-27, 2020 
  GRAND COALITION  IMPASSE  IMPASSE + CDM 
IMPASSE + 
RECYCLING 
         
  % differences  with baseline  differences  with IMPASSE 
Welfare  -0.69  -0.72  0.02  -0.01 
         
  € / tCO2    % differences with IMPASSE 
ETS-price   18  52  -48  5 
         
  %  differences with IMPASSE 
Carbon leakage   1.0  3.3  -3.0  -0,7 
         
  % differences  with baseline  differences with IMPASSE 
Employment ETS-sectors  0.4  -3.2  2.0  1.6 
Source: WorldScan 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the impact of allowing CDM up to the limits proposed in ‘ 20 20 in 2020’  
in IMPASSE by comparing costs of the ETS in the different ETS-sectors with GRAND COALITION 
and IMPASSE. The figure shows the unit cost shares of ETS-permits for different industries at 
the level of EU-27, taking account of both the direct and the indirect costs (such as the permit 
value in the electricity input bought by the aluminium industry). The figure shows that the ETS-
unit cost-shares in IMPASSE+CDM come quite close to the unit cost-shares in GRAND 
COALITION and are considerably smaller than in IMPASSE. The impacts on employment in ETS-
sectors in IMPASSE+CDM are substantially smaller than in IMPASSE as well (see figure 4.3). In 
2020 IMPASSE+CDM entails an employment loss for ETS-sectors of 1.2% compared to the 
baseline. The loss in production is 1.7% and the production leakage rate 25% (implying a 
production increase outside EU-27 to an extent of 0.4% of EU-27 production). Thus, in a stand-
alone climate policy environment the provisions of ‘ 20 20 in 2020’ regarding CDM-usage 
seem to rule out large impacts on competitiveness as well as carbon leakage. Hence, one may 
conclude that even if the post-2012 negotiations would lead to the unfavourable outcome of an 
IMPASSE the remedy of adopting BTAs may not be worth the effort and worse than the disease.  
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4.5  Robustness of results 
The impact on competitiveness depends crucially on how import flows from different origins 
respond to price differentials. The so-called Armington elasticities determine this 
responsiveness. These elasticities are key parameters in the model. Central values in WorldScan 
are based on Hertel, et al, 2004). To test the robustness of the results a sensitivity analysis was 
carried out with alternative values of the Armington elasticities (Table 4.9).  
Table 4.9  Leakage rates and production change in ETS-sectors at alternative levels of Armingron 
elasticities, 2020 
  Central values  50% of central values  150% of central values 
       
  Armington elasticities 
 Electricity  4.6  2.3  6.9 
 Ferrous metals  4.9  2.5  7.4 
 Chemical, rubber, plastic products  5.6  2.8  8.4 
 Mineral products  4.8  2.4  7.2 
 Paper products, publishing  4.9  2.5  7.4 
 Non-ferrous metals  7.4  3.7  11.1 
       
  Carbon leakage rates in % 
GRAND COALITION  0.9  0.7  1.2 
IMPASSE without CDM  3.3  1.9  4.4 
       
  ETS production in % difference from baseline 
IMPASSE without CDM  -4.5  -1.6  -6.7 
       
  ETS production leakage rate  in % 
IMPASSE without CDM  38  -  58 
Source: WorldScan 
 
With Armington elasticities at 50% of the central values, there is a more sluggish response of 
trade flows to price differentials between domestic and foreign producers. Carbon leakage is 
about  80% of the level at central values in GRAND COALITION and 60% in IMPASSE; the 
production decline of ETS-sectors is 60% less than in IMPASSE; production leakage is only 
present in the ferrous and non-ferrous metal sectors and not occurring in other ETS-sectors.  
With higher Armingtons, 150% of the central values, trade flows respond stronger to price 
changes. Carbon leakage rates increase with about one third; the production decline of ETS-
sectors is 50% more  than in IMPASSE and production leakage rates increase on average with 
50% too. 
 
It should be kept in mind that the outcomes need some qualification. First, labour supply and 
unemployment are exogenous in the WorldScan version that is used here.  Hence, there are no 
impacts from reduced real wages on labour supplies, nor do climate change policies induce a 
(short-term) rise in unemployment. Second, only average impacts on ETS-sectors are shown 
and individual plants may obviously be affected differently. Moreover, though we did come as 
close to the ETS sector classification as our database allowed, some of these extend to a broader   32 
group of industries that are not covered by the ETS. Hence, the negative impacts for some 
industries (such as basic chemicals and paper production) in IMPASSE may understate the actual 
consequences because the costs increase due to the ETS has been applied to a wider sector 
(such as chemical, rubber and plastic products and paper and publishing).   33 
5  Conclusions  
We use WorldScan, a multi-region multi-sector global general equilibrium model to assess the 
implications of border tax adjustments to protect the competitiveness of energy intensive 
industries in the EU. This study shows simulation outcomes for a number of stylized policy 
environments for 2020. In IMPASSE the EU is virtually alone in adopting a strict CO2 emissions 
ceiling of 20% below the 1990 level. Though emission trading allows for some flexibility 
among energy-intensive sectors (the ETS-sectors). In GRAND COALITION a global coalition aims 
at meeting the EU two-degree temperature target. EU targets in 2020 are 30% below the 1990 
level, full emissions trading is allowed for.  
 
The stand-alone European climate policy IMPASSE brings only modest global reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Reduction comes at relatively high costs; the global climate regime 
GRAND COALITION quadruples reductions at the same costs 
 
Does unilateral climate policy by the EU lead to changes in competitiveness and relocation of 
energy-intensive industries to non-abating countries? 
·  In general we find only modest effects on competitiveness. Even in energy-intensive sectors, 
energy expenditure is only a fraction of total production costs. Trade flows are hardly affected, 
because intra-European trade is much more important than inter European trade. Also, the 
energy-intensive sector is small compared to other sectors. 
·  IMPASSE with CDM comes closest to the current EU-proposals. CDM allows ETS-sectors to 
benefit from inexpensive abatement options in developing countries. Impacts on 
competitiveness of energy-intensive sectors are limited. In 2020 employment loss amounts to 
about 1.2%.  
·  In IMPASSE without CDM the competitiveness of energy-intensive sectors is affected more 
negatively. On average, emission prices are higher and shifts in production and employment are 
stronger. Both production and employment for the aggregate ETS-sector fall by 3-4%. In non-
ETS sectors there is a production gain of 0.4%. Moreover, production leakage is considerable: 
almost 40% of the decline in ETS-production pops up as a rise in production outside the EU. 
Carbon leakage is small – with a leakage rate of over 3%.  
·  The climate policy environment predominantly determines the impacts on both global CO2 
emissions and the competitiveness of ETS-sectors in the EU. In a global climate regime the 
relatively energy efficient EU ETS-sectors can benefit from a competitive advantage, as can be 
seen from GRAND COALITION.  
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How would border trade measures, more specific import duties and export subsidies, mitigate 
the impacts of the climate policy? 
·  Both import levies on ETS-imports and export refunds for ETS-exports partly restore 
competitiveness. If energy-intensive non-EU-imports face a levy that reflects the additional 
costs for EU producers due to the ETS, EU sectors loose less market share to foreign 
competitors on domestic  markets. With a refund on exports, reflecting the costs of the ETS, EU 
energy-intensive sectors can restore their market share on foreign markets.  With import levies 
and export refunds employment losses in ETS sectors are less than two thirds of what they 
would have been in IMPASSE without CDM. 
·  Export refunds are more effective in restoring production and employment losses in ETS-
sectors. The EU is a net exporter of energy intensive products.  
·  Border tax measures reduce carbon leakage. Compared to a 3.3% carbon leakage in IMPASSE 
without CDM, with import levies and export refunds leakage drops to 0.5%. 
·  Border tax measures may entail a welfare loss for the outside world. Due to favourable terms-
of-trade effects, the EU benefits from an import levy. An export refund is welfare decreasing, 
due to government spending on export refunds. 
·  Trade measures are not a credible threat to non-abating countries. Trade measures do not seem 
to be effective in persuading non-abating countries to join a climate change regime. However, 
these measures mitigate the negative structural effects for affected sectors. Theoretically 
speaking, it is possible to raise import duties to a level where they may be harmful for outsiders.  
It seems unlikely that WTO-agreements allow for these extreme measures.  
·  There are alternatives to border tax measure to take the sharp edge of a unilateral climate 
regime like IMPASSE.  
·  Recycling the auction revenues to ETS-sectors helps energy-intensive sectors to cope with 
higher energy costs. In IMPASSE WITH RECYCLING, where 80% of the auction receipts are 
redistributed to exposed  ETS-industries, employment loss in EU ETS-sectors is only half of 
what it would have been without recycling. 
 
Is there a case for trade measures to restore the level playing field? 
·  Whether border tax measures will be implemented, however, is disputable. There is no 
definitive answer to the question whether such measures would be WTO-legal. Border trade 
measures might well be found to contravene WTO’s Article I on most-favoured nation (MFN) 
treatment. The question hinges on whether it is permissible to consider the carbon content of a 
good when deciding whether two goods are due similar treatment. On the other hand, based on 
article XX of the WTO (the environmental window), the EU may argue for a countervailing 
tariff on the ground that the absence of a carbon policy in non-coalition countries represents an 
implicit production and export subsidy. To a large extent the answer will depend on the design 
of the measure in question, of course. 
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